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Abstract
The study extends the implications of Piketty’s celebrated literature from developed countries 
to the nexus between developed nations and African countries by building on responses from 
Rogoff (2014) & Stiglitz (2014), post Washington Consensus paradigms and underpinnings 
from Solow-Swan & Boyce-Fofack-Ndikumana. The central argument presented is that the 
inequality problem is at the heart of rational asymmetric development between rich and poor 
countries. Piketty has shown that inequality increases when the return of capital is higher than 
the growth rate, because the poor cannot catch-up with the rich. We argue that, when the 
return of political economy (or capitalism-fuelled illicit capital flight) is higher than the 
growth rate in African countries, inequality in development increases and African may not 
catch-up with the developed world. As an ideal solution, Piketty has proposed progressive 
income taxation based on automatic exchange of bank information. The ideal analogy 
proposed in tackling the spirit of African poverty is a holistic commitment to fighting illicit 
capital flight based on automatic exchange of bank information. Hence, contrary to theoretical 
underpinnings of exogenous growth models, catch-up may not be so apparent. Implications 
for the corresponding upward bias in endogenous development and catch-up literature are 
discussed.  
JEL Classification: B20; F35; F50; O19; O55
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31. Introduction
‘Output may be growing, and yet the mass of the people may be becoming poorer’ 
(Lewis, 1955). ‘Lewis led all developing countries to water, proverbially speaking, some 
African countries have so far chosen not to drink’ (Amavilah, 2014). While Piketty’s (2014) 
celebrated ‘capital in the 21st century’ is consistent with Lewis, it has taken only developed 
countries to the stream. The present study aims to correct this shortcoming by extending the 
implications of Piketty’s findings to African countries. In what follows, we articulate why it is 
important to extend Piketty’s celebrated literature because the growing evidence of inequality 
as a challenge to 21st century capitalism extends beyond the scope of developed countries 
(Brada & Bah, 2014).
Irrational policies are increasingly driving exclusive development (Li et al., 2011, p. 
109) due to ‘immiserizing growth’2 (Bhagwati, 1958). According to some accounts (Asongu 
& De Moor, 2015), the Top 1 percent have gained most (if not all) of the revenue accruing 
from the recent economic recovery (Covert, 2015). Since income inequality has substantially 
increased over the past decade (Milanovic, 2011), Oxfam (2015) sustains that the income of 
the Top 1% in the World could exceed that of the Bottom 99% by the year 2016. Consistent 
with Joseph Stiglitz:  “There has been no improvement in well-being for the typical American 
family for 20 years. On the other side, the top one percent of the population gets 40 percent 
more in one week than the bottom fifth receive in a full year”(Nabi, 2013, p.10). Therefore, 
there is an imperative “Need to design the right economic policies to enhance inclusiveness 
specially in the developing countries” (Nabi, 2013, p. 13). Reducing exclusive development 
would require, inter alia, improving how finance drives growth (Freeman, 2010). A position 
that is broadly shared by the World Hunger (2010) which has concluded that the principal 
                                                            
2 Economic growth can be associated with substantial negative externalities, hence producing disequalizing 
income-distribution. The presence of such a scenario debunks the celebrated inverted U-shape nexus between 
inequality and industrialisation, advanced by Kuznets (1955, 1971). 
4cause of poverty and hunger in the globe today is a mainstream economic system that has 
encouraged the minority to grab most of the global wealth, such that the bottom billion  are 
abandoned just to survive. 
As far as we have reviewed, responses to the work of Piketty have included, among 
others, reviews and commentaries of diverse nature. These entail: cross-checking of facts 
(Branko, 2014: Krusell & Smith, 2014), data quality (Reynolds, 2014), reviews (Homburg, 
2014; Allen, 2014), need for a more holistic approach to the global inequality problem
(Rogoff, 2014a) and divers positions on real issues behind inequality (Stiglitz, 2014). Among 
the above responses, those of Rogoff and Stiglitz are the closest to the present line of inquiry. 
According to Rogoff (2014a), Piketty’s approach to the inequality problem should not 
have been limited to developed countries. The narrative sustains that it should also have 
incorporated developing (especially African) nations because the poor in developed countries 
may be considered super-rich in relative terms when perceived from less developed countries. 
Moreover, the notion that inequality should be grounded exclusively on capitalism has some 
fundamental shortcomings when issues like colonialism, slavery, among others are 
considered. Accordingly, the externalities of colonialism have substantially contributed to 
global inequality (Frankema, 2006). Stiglitz (2014) has sustained that institutions like 
democracy matter more in ‘21st century inequality’ as opposed to capitalism. According to the 
narrative, “If we get the rules of the game right, we might even be able to restore the rapid 
and shared economic growth that characterized the middle-class societies of the mid-
twentieth century”. Two elements boldly standout from the above narratives: the need to 
integrate less developed countries and the imperative to get institutions rights from Rogoff 
and Stiglitz respectively. These elements have led to a growing stream of post Washington 
Consensus (WC) development models. Hence, before we engage how the two elements 
underpin this study, it is worthwhile to briefly highlight the post-WC models in order to 
5enhance readability and clarity.  Hence, in what follows, for the purpose of consistency, the 
discussed post-WC paradigms are centred on institutions and the middle class. 
A recent critical comment by Asongu & Kodila-Tedika (2014) on institutions and 
poverty clearly articulates the importance of the middle class and inequality in the post-WC 
development agenda. These include, inter alia: the Liberal Institutional Pluralism (LIP), New 
Structural Economics (NSE) and the Moyo Conjecture reconciling the WC with the Beijing 
Model (BM). In essence, China’s outstanding economic development has led to a new stream 
of studies clearly articulating the middle class and institutions as prime factors in the post-WC 
development agenda. These include, inter alia: debunking the myths surrounding Sino-
African relations (Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013), convergence between the BM and WC as a 
new development paradigm (Asongu, 2014a), greater need for self-reliance by African 
countries in charting their course to development (Fofack, 2014), the false economic of pre-
conditions (Monga, 2014), development strategies based on a mixture successful development 
models with the WC (Fosu, 2013a), the NSE (Lin & Monga, 2011; Norman & Stiglitz, 2012; 
Stiglitz et al., 2013ab; Stiglitz & Lin, 2013) that is advancing a synthesis between liberalism 
and structuralism, the LIP3  based on quality & types of institutions in public service delivery 
(Acemoglu et al., 2005; Rodrik, 2008; Brett, 2009; 2014, pp. 5-9) and the Moyo Conjecture 
which has been partially confirmed in Africa (Asongu, 2014b) and a broad sample of 
developing counties (Lalountas et al., 2011)4. 
As we shall substantiate in latter sections, it is important to articulate how post-WC 
models are linked to the extension of Piketty’s findings to developing countries. For instance, 
while the Moyo conjecture emphasises that political rights should be prioritised because they 
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4 There is growing stream of literature emphasising that political rights institutions are more endogenous to 
economic growth (Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2014; Asongu, 2014c). The Moyo proposal/hypothesis is founded on 
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6mitigate inequality in the long-run (Moyo, 2013; Asongu, 2014a), Stiglitz (2014) in 
responding to Piketty, has sustained that democracy is the principal cause of inequality in the 
21st century. A logical implication of this contradiction is that the issues at play may revolve 
beyond the underlying debates to more in-depth realities that limit both democracy and 
economic rights in developing countries, even in the presence of burgeoning economic 
growth. 
In light of the above, less developed countries, the middle class and institutions are 
necessary to extend the implications of Piketty in the context of post-WC development 
models. Therefore, building on responses from Rogoff (2014a) and Stiglitz (2014), we argue 
that the inequality problem between developed nations and African countries is at the centre 
of rational asymmetric development. Piketty has shown that inequality increases when the 
return of capital is higher than the growth rate. We argue that, when the return of political 
economy (or capitalism-fuelled illicit capital flight) is higher than the growth rate in African 
countries, inequality in development increases. The intuition for the parallel analysis is 
fundamentally based on high levels of illicit capital flight from African countries far 
outweighing economic growth rates (OECD, 2014)5. Moreover, it is important to involve less 
developed countries into the inequality agenda because Piketty’s literature has been celebrated 
on the prime factor that it has debunked the Kuznets’ conjectures. But the conjectures of the 
latter were based on a comparison between developed and developing countries. Hence, the 
comparative scope of the present line of inquiry is granted and relevant to providing a more 
holistic perspective of Piketty’s implications. 
To the best of our knowledge, the study in the African development literature closest 
to the current line of inquiry is Fofack (2014, p. 13) which has reviewed different ideas 
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African GDP is lost to corruption, of which a substantial portion is capital flight that is deposited in OECD tax 
havens. If the 25% is compared with the average growth rate of 5% in the continent, there is some rationale to 
infer that the rate of illicit capital fight might far outweigh the growth rate. 
7proposed for African development over the past decades and concluded on a development 
path based on self-reliance. This study consolidates the view of more self-reliance by 
extending the conclusions of Piketty’s celebrated literature to African countries. Hence, the 
present paper steers clear of past models of African development. These include, among 
others: the Lagos Plan of Action for Economic Development (LPA, 1980-2000); the Africa’s 
Priority for Economic Recovery (APPER, 1986-1990); the African Charter for Popular 
Participation for Development (1990); the African Alternative Framework to Structural 
Adjustment Programme for Socioeconomic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP, 1989) 
and the 2001 New Partnership for African Development: NEPAD (OAU, 1980, 2001; 
Adedeji, 2002; Bujra, 2004). 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 relates Piketty’s work to post-
WC models. In Section 3, we engage why Kuznets and developing countries are important 
elements in the 21st century inequality agenda. Underpinnings for ‘rational asymmetric 
development’ and ‘spirit of poverty’ are discussed in Section 4. In Section 5, we extend the 
conclusions of Piketty by building on responses from Rogoff (2014a) & Stiglitz (2014) and 
underpinnings from Solow-Swan and Boyce-Fofack-Ndikumana. It also discusses 
implications for an upward bias in endogenous development and catch-up literature. Section 6 
concludes.
2. Piketty and post Washington Consensus (WC) models
This section relates Piketty’s work to post-WC models. The discussion is structured in 
five main strands: the Liberal Institutional Pluralism (LIP) and New Structural Economics 
(NSE); the Beijing Model (BM), WC & the Moyo Conjecture; issues in a development 
consensus reconciling the BM & WC; resulting ambiguities on which this present line of 
inquiry is positioned and challenges to the new paradigms. 
8In the first strand, there are two principal axes of post-WC models that have gained 
prominence after the 2008 financial crisis (Fofack, 2014, p. 9). These models are consistent 
with Piketty’s literature on the failure of the capitalist model. Fofack is even more critical in
clearly articulating how the ‘private capitalism’ experiment has failed in Africa. For instance, 
going by the definition of the WC as ‘government policies based on privitisation, 
marketisation and liberalisation’, African countries have lost decades subscribing to 
prescriptions of the WC because, the poor economic performance of most developing 
countries have been traceable to structural adjustment policies based on this WC for the most 
part (Fofack, 2014, p. 5-6; Lin, 2015). 
The NSE has been presented by Chang (2002), Lin & Monga (2011), Norman & 
Stiglitz (2012), Stiglitz et al. (2013ab), Stiglitz & Lin (2013) and Lin (2015) who have 
advocated for a synthesis between the structuralism and liberalism ideologies. According to 
the narrative, the authors have recognised both State and market failures but have failed to 
provide a unified economic development theory for the purpose. The LIP is oriented towards
institutions that are needed at various stages of the development process. It has focused on 
inter alia: institutional conditions for successful growth, institutional diversity and institutions 
for the effective delivery of public commodities (Brett, 2009; Rodrik, 2008; Acemoglu et al., 
2005; North, 1990). While Piketty’s work is related to the above on the need to rethink the 
WC, the argument in the current paper is aligned with the need for a post-WC paradigm that
integrates certain specificities of African development which directly draw on the 
implications of ‘capital in the 21st century’. 
Moyo (2013) in the second strand has defined the BM as ‘state capitalism, de-
emphasised democracy and priority in economic rights’ while the WC is ‘private capitalism, 
liberal democracy and priority in political rights’. According to the narrative, the WC (BM) 
should be a long- (short-) run development model because the WC is more inclusive and 
9sustainable relative to the BM. In essence, for political rights to be demanded in a sustainable 
manner, a burgeoning middle-class is needed: one which would not fall into the temptation of
having its political rights strongly influenced by basic economic needs like food. In a nutshell, 
what is now coined as the ‘Moyo conjecture’ sustains that economic rights should be 
prioritised at the early stages of development while political rights should be given priority at 
more advanced stages of economic development. It should be noted that the Moyo conjecture 
is aligned with the LIP because it clearly identifies institutions that are needed at various 
stages of economic development. According to the view, economic institutions should
precede political institutions in terms of development priorities. 
In the third strand on reconciling the BM with the WC, two important points are note 
worthy. First, the Moyo conjecture is substantially based on the Kuznets nexus between 
inequality and industrialisation because it assumes that the WC would mitigate inequality in 
the long-run at a better rate than the BM. Second, Piketty’s literature has debunked the 
Kuznets underpinnings on which the Moyo conjecture is based. Given that the WC is the 
development model applied in most of the sampled countries on which Piketty’s findings are 
based, issues surrounding the paradigms are open to debate because the Moyo conjecture and 
Kuznets underpinning are based on comparative analysis between developed nations and 
developing countries. 
We devote some space to engaging how the attempt by the Moyo conjecture to 
reconcile the NSE and LIP has left room with which to motivate the positioning of this study:  
rational asymmetric development and sprit of poverty in Africa. First, on the relationship with 
the LIP, the conjecture has complemented the paradigm by clearly articulating an institutional
design of development. In line with the narrative, the transition from low-income to higher-
income should be accompanied with a trading-off of ‘economic rights priorities’ for ‘political 
rights priorities’. Second, the NSE paradigm is complemented by laying down some 
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foundation for a unified economic theory that accounts for both market and State failures.  In 
essence, whereas the proposed BM as short-run development preference favours prudence in 
economic openness and State regulation, the WC (or long-term) alternative is opposed to the 
stated preferences. 
A substantial challenge to the NSE paradigm (see Acemoglu et al., 2005, p. 387) is the 
absence of some kind of causal nexus between economic growth and a specific institutional 
design. Asongu (2014a) sustains that the conjecture has tackled the issue by establishing that 
economic (political) institutions should be the priority at the early (latter) stages of 
industrialisation. The contribution has steered clear of the fundamental ‘one-size fits all’ 
framework which does not incorporate the structural and institutional challenges at various 
stages of the development process.  In the same vein, while political rights should be 
prioritised because they mitigate inequality in the long-run (Moyo, 2013; Asongu, 2014a), 
Stiglitz (2014) in responding to Piketty, has sustained that democracy is the principal cause of 
inequality in the 21st century. A logical implication of this contradiction is that the issues at 
play may revolve beyond the underlying debates to more in-depth realities that limit both 
democracy and economic rights in developing countries, notwithstanding burgeoning
economic growth. 
In Africa for instance, where poverty has been substantially documented to be 
associated with considerable huge volumes of illicit capital flight (Fofack & Ndikumana, 
2010, 2014; Boyce & Ndikumana, 2008, 2011, 2012ab; Asongu, 2014d), neither democracy 
nor sustainable economic rights might be achieved despite the apparent economic growth. In 
this context, the implications of Piketty’s work may hold valuable lessons for development 
economics when extended to African countries in light of theoretical underpinnings of the 
catch-up literature.  But before we engage this dimension, more foundations need to be 
discussed in subtle detail, inter alia:  underpinnings for the ‘rational asymmetric development’
11
& the ‘spirit of poverty’ as well as motivations for including developing countries and 
Kuznets in debates of 21st century inequality. 
3. Kuznets and developing countries have motivated responses to Piketty
‘Capital in the 21st century’ has featured prominently in most scholarly debates in 
recent months because it has debunked the previously widely celebrated Kuznets’ (1955, 
1971) conjecture on an inverted U-shape relationship between inequality and industrialisation.  
For brevity and lack of space, we resist the itch of discussing the widely known Kuznets’ 
theory to elaborate detail. What are granted for the present line of inquiry are the following 
two questions. First, is there a stream of literature on inequality in developing countries 
consistent with the narrative of Piketty? Second, why should developing countries matter as 
much as developed nations in the celebration of Piketty?
To the first question, we have already highlighted that the Kuznets conjectures on 
which the celebration of Piketty’s work substantially draws, is based on a comparison 
between developed and developing countries. Hence, it is only natural that findings of the 
celebrated literature be extended to a broad sample of developing countries. But of more 
direct bearing to this line of defence is Rogoff’s (2014a) response on issues of 21st inequality. 
Why only capitalism? Why not colonialism? If capitalism is not fair for developed countries 
in terms of equalized income distribution, the issue should be more serious in former colonies 
where capitalism is being experimented. 
According to Rogoff, while the brilliant work of Piketty has documented within-
country inequality from rich countries, a substantial part of the cultural groundswell around 
his book emanates from people who acknowledge themselves to be within the middle-income 
strata in their own nations, but who from relative perspectives are in the upper-middle class 
and to some extend even super-rich by global standards. The narrative sustains that the 
12
exclusive focus on the developed world may not argur well with the policy prescriptions of 
progressive global wealth tax aimed at correcting issues of global income disparities between 
the richer and poorer countries: the latter nations being ultra-wealthy by global standards. The 
idea of a global wealth tax is not only tainted with enforcement issues and concerns about 
credibility. It is also politically implausible because fundamental causes of global inequality 
like colonialism are no taken into account: “Piketty argues that capitalism is unfair. Wasn’t 
colonialism unfair, too?”,    
Rogoff concludes that “In accepting Piketty’s premise that inequality matters more 
than growth, one needs to remember that many developing-country citizens rely on rich-
country growth to help them escape poverty. The first problem of the twenty-first century 
remains to help the dire poor in Africa and elsewhere. By all means, the elite 0.1% should pay 
much more in taxes, but let us not forget that when it comes to reducing global inequality, the 
capitalist system has had an impressive three decades”. Two insights from the about citation 
merit critical emphasis: (a) the ambiguous role of capitalism as an instrument for developed 
nations in lifting less developed countries out of poverty and (b) the justification that 
inequality also matters more than growth in the fight against poverty in developing countries. 
The former is engaged in Section 4 while the latter is consistent with the second question of 
Section 3 highlighted above, which we address immediately. 
On the second issue, developing countries also matter as much as developed nations in 
the celebration of Piketty because inequality also matters more than growth in the fight 
against poverty in less developed countries. This statement is accurate because the narratives 
of Piketty on developed countries are consistent with a growing stream of the literature on 
developing nations emphasising the needs to articulate inequality in the poverty-growth nexus 
(see Fosu, 2015; Thorbecke, 2013; Kalwij & Verschoor, 2007). The currents include, among 
others: the critical role of inequality in the alleviation of poverty (Ali & Thorbecke, 2000; 
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Datt & Ravallion, 1992; Kakwani, 1993); the essence of income-inequality in the growth
elasticities of poverty (Ravallion, 1997; Easterly, 2000; Fosu, 2015) and policy making 
(Adam, 2004). Therefore, the coverage of more developed nations by Piketty is consistent 
with evolving currents from African countries (Fosu, 2008, 2009, 2010a, 2010b) and broader 
samples of developing nations (Fosu, 2010c). 
Given that clarifying the second question of this section is crucial for the present 
study, we devote another paragraph to engaging the underlying literature analytically. It can 
be summarised in the following: as much as in developed countries, in developing nations
inequality also matters more than growth in poverty mitigation because a recent stream of 
empirical literature has established that the response of poverty to growth is a decreasing 
function of inequality, since the inequality elasticity of poverty is higher than the growth 
elasticity of poverty. In essence: “The study finds that the responsiveness of poverty to income 
is a decreasing function of inequality” (Fosu, 2010b, p. 818); “The responsiveness of poverty 
to income is a decreasing function of inequality, and the inequality elasticity of poverty is 
actually larger than the income elasticity of poverty” (Fosu, 2010c, p. 1432); and “In general, 
high initial levels of inequality limit the effectiveness of growth in reducing poverty while 
growing inequality increases poverty directly for a given level of growth” (Fosu, 2011, p. 11). 
In light of the above, the Fosu conclusions on developing countries converge with 
Piketty’s celebrated literature and Lewis’ caution: ‘Output may be growing, and yet the mass 
of the people may be becoming poorer’ (Lewis, 1955).  These intersections of Piketty, Lewis 
and Fosu are consistent with a growing stream of literature on post-2015 sustainable 
development goals (Ozgur et al., 2009; Timmons et al., 2009; Monika & Bobbin, 2012; 
Bagnara, 2012; Singh, 2014; Miller, 2014).  Therefore, in charting the pattern towards greater 
industrialisation, there is an urgent policy syndrome in developed as well as in developing 
nations of accounting for inequality in the growth effect of poverty (Asongu, 2015a). Within 
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the context of the present study, it entails incorporating some capitalism motivated rationales 
for asymmetric development that may dampen the effects of growth on poverty
4. Underpinnings for ‘rational asymmetric development’ and ‘spirit of poverty’
In this section, we elucidate (i) the concept of rational asymmetric development 
employed in the study; (ii) engage the rationale of asymmetric development in capitalism-
fuelled illicit capital flight on the one hand and on the other hand, (iii) the implications of 
capital flight in increasing poverty, with particular emphasis on case studies from resource-
rich and high-growth African countries. But as highlighted in Section 3, it is also fundamental 
to understand the ambiguous role of capitalism as an instrument by developed nations for 
lifting less developed countries out of poverty. Hence, a fourth strand in the section is devoted 
to (iv) briefly discussing the ambiguity of foreign aid when illicit capital flight outweighs
economic growth. 
The first strand provides some framework for the conception of ‘rational asymmetric 
development’ used in this study. Within the context of the paper, it refers to unfair practices 
of globalisation adopted by advanced nations to the detriment and impoverishment of less 
developed countries. The interested reader can find more insights into capitalism-driving 
rational asymmetry in ‘Making Globalization Work’ (Stiglitz, 2007) where “The average 
European cow gets a subsidy of $2 a day; more than half of the people in the developing 
world live on less than that. It appears that it is better to be a cow in Europe than to be a 
poor person in a developing country” (p. 85).  Moreover, “Without subsidies, it would not pay 
for the Unites States to produce cotton; with them, the United States is, as we have noted, the 
world's largest cotton exporter" p.85.  The Chang (2007) ‘Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free 
Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism’ also clearly articulates the asymmetric 
development position adopted by this study. An interesting African narrative is told by 
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Mshomba (2011) who has provided a systematic review of the relations between Africa and 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
In the second strand, the rationale for asymmetric development in capitalism-fuelled 
illicit capital flight is driven substantially by a plethora of factors, among others: tax evasion 
by multinationals and investment of siphoned funds by African public officials in markets 
with security and high turnover. (i) Multinational corporations in Africa have been using 
questionable accounting practices to declare low profits and hence pay less tax to domestic 
governments. This engenders negative implications for economic sustainability in domestic 
economies (Osabuohien et al., 2013, 2014, 2015).  (ii) There is a growing stream of literature 
sustaining that a substantial chunk of the wealth siphoned by corrupt African officials is 
deposited in offshore financial centres that are under the jurisdictions of OECD nations
(Boyce & Ndikumana, 2003). Hence, the off-shore financial centres are politically and 
economically managed by the corresponding OECD nations. The interested reader can find 
more insights substantiating this first strand in a study by the European Network on Debt and
Development (EURODAD, 2008) on addressing development’s ‘black hole’ through capital 
flight regulation. Features of capitalism-fuelled illicit capital flight documented in the report 
include, inter alia: tax havens, investment and abusive transfer pricing, tax concessions, the 
emergence of hedge funds & private equity, speculation & volatility, capital account 
liberalisation & its implications, the International Monetary Fund’s (IMFs) failure in financial 
regulation & surveillance, European countries facilitating capital flight and regulatory failures 
in private equity & hedge funds. The above narrative can be summarised in one sentence: 
asymmetric development is fundamentally driven by capitalism-fuelled illicit capital flight 
practices. The poverty implications of such practices are worth elucidating.
The third strand discusses the implications of capital flight in increasing poverty & 
inequality, with particular emphasis on case studies from resource-rich and high-growth 
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African countries. We first briefly discuss why capitalism motivated illicit capital flight 
dampens the growth effects on poverty before presenting some case studies. Consistent with 
Asongu (2014d), capital flight has substantially increased inequality in less developed 
countries owing to regressive effects in wealth distribution. In line with the narrative, 
individuals that indulge in such activities for the most part, are among the politico-economic 
elites who have been taking advantage of privileged positions to siphon and channel stolen 
funds to more advanced countries. According to the underlying literature (Boyce & 
Ndikumana, 1998, 2001), the acquisition and transfer of such funds very often entail legally 
questionable practices like trade misinvoicing (or falsification of trade documents), kickbacks 
on private & public contracts and embezzlement of export income. The unappealing 
consequences from shortages in income and unfavourable foreign exchange terms bear a 
higher negative weight on the poorer faction of the citizens. Moreover, Asongu (2014d) has 
sustained that the regressive effect of illicit capital flight is further strengthened by financial 
imbalances which culminate in devaluations that have a less negative effect on the wealthy 
because they often possess foreign assets that insulate them from the unappealing effects. 
We now discuss some country-specific cases in which economic growth has been 
accompanied with substantial capital flight, hence, leading to low levels of wellbeing and lack 
of basic needs. In line with Ndikumana & Boyce (2012), resource-rich countries in Africa 
have been associated with the highlighted features. We consider the examples of Equatorial 
Guinea, the Republic of Congo and Gabon, which are among Africa’s wealthiest countries. 
Congo, Gabon & Equatorial Guinea are 15th, 5th and 2nd respectively with corresponding per 
capita incomes of $1,253, $4,176 & $8,649. These countries have also been endowed with 
massive oil reserves, ranking 7th, 8th & 10th for Gabon, Congo & Equatorial Guinea 
respectively. Meanwhile the citizens of these nations are living in abject conditions. They are 
lacking elementary schools, drinkable water, basic social services, decent sanitation and 
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health care. In terms of population immunisation against measles, Gabon & Equatorial Guinea 
rank second- and third-to-the last with 55% and 51% respectively. Moreover, the odds of a 
child reaching his/her fifth day are higher in Equatorial Guinea relative to the sub-Saharan 
African average. 
It is also important to devote space for an in-depth analysis of how capital flight has 
deteriorated the quality of growth in the three countries. The Quality of Growth rankings
recently published by the IMF shows deterioration in the positions of the underlying countries 
between 1990 and 2011 (Mlachila et al., 2014, p.27). From a comparative assessment of 93 
developing nations in the periods 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004 & 2005-2011, the 
performance of these countries has deteriorated: Congo Republic (59th, 70th, 74th & 84th); 
Equatorial Guinea (76th, 73rd, 76th  & 88th)  and Gabon (58th, 61st, 67th & 69th).
In the fourth strand, we briefly discuss the ambiguity of foreign aid in poverty 
mitigating in situations where capital flight is higher than economic growth. Though the 
stated purpose of this study is not to discuss the issue of foreign aid, unfortunately we cannot 
resist the itch of engaging the political economy of development assistance because foreign 
aid is a substantial dichotomy of illicit capital flight. Accordingly, there is mainstream 
consensus that capital flight is about tenfold the annual development assistance flows and 
twofold the amount of debt repaid by developing economies annually (Diak, 2014). A recent 
theoretical postulation that capitalism-driven debts fuel inequality (Azzimonti et al., 2014) has
been verified and confirmed in Africa (Asongu et al., 2014). The fact that Africa is a net 
creditor to the rest of the world is now a widely accepted economic fact in academic and 
policy circles (Asongu, 2014d). In what follows, we briefly discuss the paradox of  capital 
flight in a capital-starved African continent before extending the implications of Piketty to 
Africa in light of the literature we have analytically engaged this far. 
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5. The paradox of African capital flight and extension of Piketty
5.1 The paradox of capital flight from a capital-starved Africa 
Consistent with Asiedu et al. (2012), a reason for Africa’s underdevelopment is the 
lack of investment capital. In accordance with the Harrod-Domar model, three arguments 
have been put forward: (i) the continent has a financing gap because invested capital is less 
than the capital required for investment in sustainable growth; (ii) long-term development can 
be achieved if the financing gap is filled and (iii) in order to bridge the financing gap, Africa 
would need external capital in the forms of debts and development assistance. Hence, there 
have been recurrent calls for more foreign aid and attempts at attracting other forms of 
financing like foreign direct investment (FDI) or long-term capital from domestic financial 
markets have not been very successful (Asiedu, 2004; Asongu, 2012). Consistent with the 
narrative, the relevance of external capital in African development is clearly articulated in the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and New Partnership for African Development 
(NEPAD). Figure 1 below highlights the position that illicit capital flows have been 
increasing at the higher rate relative to FDI and foreign aid. 
Figure 1: Illicit Capital Flight (ICF), Foreign Aid, and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): Average 
Annual per Country Flows, 1970-2008 (million, constant 2008 $)
Source: Asiedu et al. (2012)
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Consistent with Asiedu et al. (2012), reliance on external financing to address the 
investment needs in order to fight poverty in Africa is problematic for at least three reasons. 
First, foreign aid and FDI are volatile and volatility has adverse consequences on economies
(see Kangoye, 2013). Second, an extensive literature on growth shows that the effect of 
foreign aid on economic growth is ambiguous, with provocative titles like ‘foreign aid follies’ 
(Rogoff, 2014b), sceptical conclusions from surveys, documenting literature on more than 40 
years of foreign aid (Doucouliagos & Paldam, 2008, 2009) or the debates (Asongu, 2014e) 
and clarifications (Asongu, 2015b) on the questionable economics of foreign aid for inclusive 
human development in Africa. Third, the region has made very unsuccessful attempts at 
attracting FDI. There is an interesting stream of FDI (Asiedu & Lien, 2011; Anyanwu, 2012) 
and African business (Rolfe & Woodward, 2004; Bartels et al., 2009; Asongu, 2013a)
literature supporting this position. 
The narrative concludes that given previous unsuccessful attempts at attracting 
external flows, the trend is not very likely to change. Hence, it is unrealistic to substantially 
rely on external finance for investment needs in the short- & medium-terms. In proposing a 
solution, the authors have recommended that sub-Saharan African nations establish effective 
strategies toward mitigating illicit capital flight within the framework of a broader agenda of 
resource mobilization for economic development. Extending the implications of Piketty with 
Solow-Swan and Boyce-Fofack-Ndikumana is a step towards consolidating this 
recommendation. 
5.2 Extending Piketty with Solow-Swan and Boyce-Fofack-Ndikumana
It is interesting to first of all clarify the context of Boyce-Fofack-Ndikumana and 
Solow-Swan before discussing how the underpinnings are relevant in extending the 
implications of Piketty. 
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First, the concept of catch-up or convergence motivated by Solow-Swan (1956) builds 
from an assumption of diminishing returns, such that less developed countries are endowed 
with a higher marginal capital productivity. In this light, due to similar levels of savings, poor 
economies as expected to grow faster relative to their developed counterparts. Hence, a 
negative correlation is expected between initial income levels and future growth rates. 
Therefore, the extension of Piketty in this study is typically consistent with the theoretical 
underpinnings employed in cross-country income convergence literature (Solow, 1956; Swan, 
1956; Baumol, 1986; Barro, 1991; Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995; Mankiw et al., 1992; 
Fung, 2009) which have been recently extended to other fields of development, notably: 
financial markets (Narayan et al., 2011; Bruno et al., 2012), intellectual property rights 
(Asongu, 2013b;  Andrés & Asongu, 2013), forecasting of political crisis (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2014), knowledge economy (Asongu, 2013c) and inclusive human development 
(Asongu, 2014f). In this light, extending Piketty’s work is within this recent stream of 
literature employing the theoretical underpinnings of Solow-Swan within broader 
development frameworks. 
The use of Boyce-Fofack-Ndikumana is to emphasis studies which to the best of our 
knowledge have substantially enriched the literature on African capital flight. Hence, it is 
neither meant to underestimate contributions from other authors in this research area nor to 
consider works of underlying authors as supreme relative to those of their peers in the field. 
Therefore, the acronym is as far as we have reviewed, limited to our knowledge at the time of 
this study. 
The extension of Piketty is a three-step analogy: conclusion, implication and 
recommendation. Piketty has concluded that (i) when the return to capital is higher than the 
growth rate, inequality increases. Hence, (ii) the poor cannot catch-up with the rich. He has 
proposed an ideal solution (iii) of progressive income taxation (targeting the return on capital) 
21
that is based on automatic exchange of bank information. As an extension, (i) we postulate 
that when the return to political economy (or capitalism-fuelled illicit capital flight) is higher 
than the growth rate, there is asymmetric development between rich and poor countries. (ii) 
Therefore, poor countries like Africa may not catch-up with the West. (iii) The ideal analogy 
proposed in tackling the spirit of African poverty is a holistic commitment to fighting illicit 
capital flight based on automatic exchange of bank information. Hence, contrary to the 
theoretical underpinnings of exogenous growth models, catch-up may not be so apparent 
unless missing aggregate savings are restored through genuine commitments to fighting illicit 
capital flight. This has important implications for the upward bias in endogenous 
development.    
5.4 Implications for the upward bias in endogenous development and catch-up
Contrary to some evidence documenting catch-up by African countries with direct 
assessment of questions like ‘Is Africa Actually Developing?’ (Alan & Carlyn, 2015, p. 598), 
there are strong arguments with which to suggest the contrary. While the underlying literature 
sustains that Africa is catching-up because it is experiencing a higher growth rate relative to 
developed countries or declining poverty relative to other regions of the world (Fosu, 2015)6, 
this catch-up may not be so apparent when a fraction of GDP lost to illicit capital flight is 
factored-in. A natural criticism that may arise could be whether the corresponding illicit 
capital flight is deducted from GDP ex-ante or ex-post of per capita GDP convergence 
estimations. Accordingly, corruption from African elites has been documented to substantially 
derive from the inflation of consumption and investment components of GDP (Boyce & 
Ndikumana, 2003). Boyce & Ndikumana have documented an interesting literature of public 
debts and private assets as core determinants of capital flight in Sub-Saharan African nations.  
                                                            
6 It should be noted that the period of catch-up advanced by Fosu (2015) is consistent with the sample periodicity 
(or from the mid-1990s) during which Africa has experienced growth resurgence. This is consistent with the 
earlier position by Alan & Carlyn (2015) of Africa catching-up with the USA from the mid-1990s.
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It is logical to infer that a substantial amount of siphoned funds is considered ex-ante 
of GDP per capita computations and hence, illicit capital flight is part of reported GDP. A 
natural logic that follows is that if illicit capital flows from an economy is higher than the 
growth rate of the underlying economy, catch-up with developed countries would remain very 
elusive. This inference is based on the assumption that illicit capital flows are hidden in tax 
havens based in developed countries. We have already alluded to why illicit capital flight is: 
(i) higher than economic growth and (ii) deposited for the most part in developed nations, in 
the introduction. Moreover, there is a substantial body of literature confirming that a great 
portion of illicit capital flows are deposited in OECD countries (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2003).  
As an implication, there may be an upward or positive bias in the endogenous GDP of African 
nations used in the convergence literature. This may partly explain why Africa’s growth 
miracle has been underestimated by about 400% (Young, 2012) and goes a long way to 
casting some shadow on recent findings establishing that Africa is on time for certain 
millennium development poverty targets (Pinkivskiy  & Sala-i-Martin, 2014). 
In order to understand the wider implications of the above in the catch-up literature, it 
is important to examine the results beyond the light of widely documented per capita income 
convergence and engage how the inferences reflect the scarce human development catch-up 
literature. Consistent with Asongu (2014f), by 2008, Konya & Guisan (2008, p. 9) 
acknowledged that only three studies had examined catch-up in living standards, notably: 
Mazumdar (2002), Sutcliffe (2004) & Noorbakhsh (2006). Following Konya & Guisan, to the
best of our knowledge three more studies have been added to the scarce literature on human 
development catch-up. These include: Mayer-Foulkes (2010), Clark (2011) and Asongu 
(2014f). 
Mazumdar (2002) had examined if the human development index (HDI) converged 
during the period 1960-1995 in 91 countries and concluded on the absence of convergence. 
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Sutcliffe (2004) has also rebuffed the idea of HDI convergence in 99 countries using a more 
updated sample (1975-2001). According to Sutcliffe, the idea of HDI convergence may be a
hidden agenda of some multilateral organisations like the IMF to reduce the acknowledged 
setbacks of the long-run world economic history. In the same vein, the idea of catch-up 
between Africa and the West, given appalling rates of African capital flight may be partly 
explained by the elucidations of Sutcliffe. The findings of Noorbakhsh (2006) have been 
subject to many criticisms (Konya & Guisan, 2008, pp. 28-29). 
Hobijn & Franses (2001) and Neumayer (2003) have also assessed catch-up in living 
standards. While the former have established the presence of divergence in living standards, 
the latter has argued that living standards be viewed from a broader spectrum and not limited 
to a simple index. Asongu (2014f) who has assessed catch-up in inequality-adjusted HDI 
(IHDI) in African countries has concluded that the income component of the IHDI moves 
slower than others and hence requires more policy intervention. In light of the above, the 
debate of catch-up in development remains widely open. Hence, our postulations after 
extending Piketty’s implications to the nexus between Africa and developed countries are 
quite sensible. 
6. Conclusion
This study has assessed the inequality problem in light of policy implications from 
Piketty’s celebrated ‘Capital in the 21st century’.  We have first situated Piketty in post 
Washington Consensus models. Next, we have presented a case for the missing dimension of 
developing countries in the underlying literature. We have then reconciled the conclusions of 
Piketty with Solow-Swan and Boyce-Fofack-Ndikumana in the catch-up and capital flight 
literatures respectively.  We have also analogically demonstrated that consistent with the 
underlying literature, when the return of political economy (or capitalism-fuelled illicit capital 
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flight) is higher than the growth rate, it would be difficult for Africa to catch-up with the 
West. In our view, the spirit of African poverty is in rational asymmetric development 
between rich and poor countries. 
It is not the purpose of this study to deny some important successes in human 
development Africa has experienced over the past decades, inter alia: reduction of infant
mortality, life expectancy, educational enrolment and information & communication 
technology (ICT) expansion. The express purpose of the study has been to lay some 
foundations for the extension of Piketty’s work to other developing countries. The logical 
postulations advanced in this paper have been based on verifiable and justifiable stylized 
facts. Whether they withstand in-depth empirical scrutiny is an interesting future research 
direction. 
An important personality that would easily subscribe to this analysis is the former IMF 
director and former German president,  Horst Köhler whom we cite in verbatim confirming  
‘rational asymmetric development’ as a spirit of poverty in Africa: “And third, there is an 
African proverb: ‘Beware of the naked man who offers you clothes.’ And my goodness, we 
Europeans are naked, with our double standards and our comfortable hypocrisy vis-à-vis our 
past and present contribution to Africa’s problems. It is high time we regained our credibility. 
Take corruption: combatting corruption is not a one-way street. Corruption in Africa also 
comes in the guise of representatives of Western corporations and European bank accounts, 
so we cannot ignore the global kleptocratic model of capitalism that is sucking obscene 
amounts of capital out of Africa in particular – and certainly more than is being invested in 
the continent as development assistance. Chief among the beneficiaries of this flight of capital 
are the European banks where African despots and tax-evading corporations stash their 
billions. If we finally brought order to the international financial system and allowed the tax 
havens to wither away, that would be credible!” (BMBF, 2014, p. 30). 
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